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Sammendrag:. En del land i Øst-Europa og tidligere 
Sovjetunionen vil sannsynligvis få muligheter til å 
utøve markedsmakt i kvotemarkedet dersom Kyoto 
Protokollen gjennomføres. Dette gjelder i særlig grad 
Russland. Imidlertid kan det innvendes at siden disse 
landene også er store eksportører av fossil energi, vil 
de ikke ha interesse av å bidra til en økt kvotepris 
gjennom å utnytte markedmakten sin i kvotemarkedet.  
      I denne artikkelen argumenterer vi for at effekten 
på kvoteprisen av deres eksport av fossil energi ikke er 
entydig. En betydelig andel av Russlands eksport av 
fossil energi er naturgass. En høy kvotepris kan øke 
etterspørselen etter naturgass ved substitusjon fra mer 
forurensende fossile energibærere (olje og kull), og 
dermed øke profitten til naturgasseksportørene. En 
eksportør av naturgass vil dermed kunne ha økte 
insentiver til å utnytte markedmakten sin i 
kvotemarkedet. Videre, vil en stor eksportør av fossil 
energi kunne bruke sin markedsposisjon til å påvirke 
etterspørselen etter kvoter og dermed kvoteprisen. 
Relasjonen mellom inntekt av kvotesalg og fossil 
energieksport kan dermed  gå i begge retninger. 
      I vår artikkel analyserer vi sammenhengen mellom 
inntekten fra kvotesalg og fossil energieksport både 
teoretisk og empirisk. Vi studerer virkningen av en 
koordinert utøvelse av markedsmakt i de to 
markedene. Ved bruk av en generell likevektsmodell 
viser vi at det faktum at det tidligere Sovjetunionen er 
en stor gasseksportør har liten innvirkning på 
incentivene til å utøve markedsmakt i kvotemarkedet. 
Derimot påvirkes det optimale nivået av gasseksport 
betydelig av en slik koordinering.   
   
Abstract: With implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, 
the Former Soviet Union countries, and Russia in 
particular, will most likely be able to exert market 
power in the emission permit market. However, since 
these countries are also big exporters of fossil fuels, 
their incentives to boost the permit price may be weak. 
However, a significant share of Russia’s fossil fuel 
exports is natural gas. A high permit price may boost 
the demand for natural gas through substitution from 
more polluting fuels and thus increase gas profits. 
Therefore, being a natural gas exporter may increase 
the incentives to exert monopoly power in the permit 
market. Moreover, a large fossil fuel exporter may use 
its market position to influence the effective demand 
for permits. Hence, the relationship between permit 
income and fossil fuels exports runs in both directions. 
We explore the interdependence between the revenues 
from permit and fossil fuel exports both theoretically 
and empirically. A numerical general equilibrium 
model finds that the fact that the Former Soviet Union 
is a big gas exporter has a negligible effect on the 
incentives to exert monopoly power in the permit 
market. However, there are significant impacts on the 
optimal level of gas exports.  
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1 Introduction 
The Kyoto Protocol requires that the average annual emissions of a basket of six greenhouse 
gases in the industrialized countries do not exceed 95 per cent of 1990 emissions in the period 
2008-20121. The Kyoto Protocol allows for emission permit trading among the Annex B 
countries. Some countries may become large sellers and buyers and thus be in a position to 
exercise market power in the permit market. As pointed out by Hahn (1984), the degree of 
market power in the permit market depends on the initial allocation of permits. The literature 
suggests that Russia and other Eastern European countries will become large exporters of 
permits (see e.g. Weyant and Hill (1999) and Weyant (1999)). It is therefore likely that the 
FSU countries will be able to exercise some market power in the emission permits market. 
Several studies show that the FSU can significantly increase its benefit of the agreement by 
restricting its supply of permits (e.g., Böhringer (2002), Bernstein et al. (1999)).   
One issue that has received little attention in the discussion about monopoly power in the 
permit market is the fact that FSU is also a large exporter of fossil fuels. According to IEA 
(2001a, 2001b), the FSU annually exports 9.9 TJ natural gas and 165 Mt crude oil. Measured 
in CO2 equivalents, the oil and gas exports each amounts to some 500 MtCO2. This is the 
same order of magnitude as the expected permit exports from the FSU (e.g. Holtsmark, 2003). 
To the extent that high permit prices reduce the demand for fossil fuels, the incentives for the 
FSU to sustain high permit prices may be rather weak (Bernard et al. (2003)). On the other 
hand, as pointed out by Hagem and Mæstad (2002) and Holtsmark (2003), high permit prices 
may induce substitution from coal and oil towards gas, making the effect of permit prices on 
the effective gas demand more ambiguous.  
A second issue that has been neglected in previous literature is that the relationship 
between permit income and income from fossil fuel exports goes in both directions. It is not 
only the case that the price of permits affects the effective demand for fossil fuels. The price 
of fossil fuels will also affect the demand for emission permits; low fuel prices and high fuel 
demand will increase the demand for permits and thus increase the potential income from 
permit exports. This relationship between fuel exports and permit prices can of course only be 
profitably utilised by countries with market power in the fossil fuel markets. The FSU enjoys 
such market power in the natural gas market; Russia’s share of the European gas market is 
42% (IEA, 2001a). Moreover, Hagem and Mæstad (2002) calculate that the combustion of 
gas in the European gas market will cause around 20% of total greenhouse gas emissions in 
all industrialised countries in 2010 (excluding the USA). The effect of gas market policies on 
permit prices may therefore be significant. 
This paper explores the incentives of the FSU to exert monopoly power in the permit 
market while taking into account the fact that the demand for permits and the demand for 
natural gas are interdependent. Not only does the permit price affect the demand for natural 
gas, the price of gas also affects the demand for emission permits.  
With interdependent demands, there is an externality between the profit of the permit 
exporter and the profit of the gas exporter as long as they are organised as separate economic 
units. There are several ways of internalising this externality. Moe and Tangen (2000) pointed 
out that it is not unlikely that the Russian authorities will allocate a substantial share of the 
country’s emission permits to various commercial agents. They also argue that the dominating 
1 USA and Australia have chosen not to ratify the Protocol, and the entering into force of the Protocol 
hinges on Russian ratification. The agreement will not enter into force until it has been ratified by at 
least 55 countries which together contribute at least 55 percent of the industrialized world’s greenhouse 
emissions in 1990.    
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Russian gas producer, Gazprom, may be left in control of a large share of Russia’s permits. 
Such allocation rules will at least partially internalise the externality caused by interdependent 
demands. A slightly different solution, which will be explored in this paper, is to grant the gas 
exporter an exclusive right to export permits. If the gas exporter wants to export permits, it 
will then first have to buy the permits in the domestic market.  In this way, the permit rent can 
be distributed across several sectors of the economy, at the same time as the externality 
between permit export and gas export is internalised.  
We find that the internalisation of the externalities caused by interdependent demands of 
natural gas and emission permits does reduce the optimal permit price, but the effect is 
insignificant. Hence, our analysis supports the conclusion that the FSU will indeed utilise its 
market power in the permit market, despite being a large fossil fuel exporter. This conclusion 
might not have been equally strong if we had also included the effect of high permit prices on 
FSU’s profits from oil exports. However, it is extremely difficult to forecast the changes in 
the producer price of oil in the wake of climate policies due to unpredictable OPEC 
behaviour. If the OPEC countries do not change their target producer price after the 
implementation of climate policies, there is no reason to worry about our model not including 
the oil sector. Our analysis also shows that the optimal export level of gas from the FSU is 
strongly affected by the interdependence between the gas and the permit markets.      
The analysis will proceed as follows: In Section 2, we present a theoretical model that 
demonstrates the interdependence between the demand for fossil fuels and the demand for 
emission permits. The optimal strategies for a monopoly fossil fuel exporter and a monopoly 
permit exporter are characterised both when these agents operate as separate economic units 
and as one integrated unit. The theoretical analysis will show that the effect of integration on 
the price of permits is ambiguous. Hence, numerical analysis is required. Section 3 presents a 
numerical general equilibrium model. The model is a variant of the GTAP-EG model, but it is 
extended by including market power both for the FSU permit exporter and for the FSU gas 
exporter. Our results are discussed in Section 4. We focus on 1) how the optimal permit price 
and the optimal gas export are influenced by the ability of permit exporters and gas exporters 
to influence the price of emission permits, and 2) how the integration of gas and permit 
exports into one single economic unit will affect the optimal permit price and gas exports. 
Section 5 concludes.   
2 A simple theoretical model 
This section presents a theory for interrelated demands between a fossil fuel and emission 
permits. The purpose of the model is to illuminate some of the important mechanisms that are 
at play in the numerical simulations that will follow.2 
We assume that there is one country that is a monopoly exporter of emission permits y and 
a monopoly producer of a fossil fuel xg (which for convenience is called gas).3 Gas is a 
substitute with alternative fuels, represented by xa.4 The inverse fuel demand function is given 
by 
2 The model is a simplified version of the model presented in Hagem and Mæstad (2002). While 
Hagem and Mæstad (2002) include oligopolistic behaviour in the fossil fuel market, the model 
presented here has one single monopoly fossil fuel exporter.  
3 The numerical model includes other gas and permit sellers as a competitive fringe.  
4 In reality, as well as in our numerical simulations, there are several alternative fuels with different 
emission intensities. It is however enough to include one such alternative fuel in order to illustrate the 
central mechanisms of the model. 
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),(,     ),( agjixxpp jiii ∈= ,                        (1)  
 
with the assumed properties 0/ <∂∂  and ii xp 0/ ≤∂∂ ji xp . 
The consumption of one unit of gas causes eg units of greenhouse gas emissions, while the 
emission factor of the alternative fuel is ea. An international environmental agreement à la the 
Kyoto Protocol defines upper bounds on the emissions of greenhouse gases in each of the 
participating countries. Emission permits are traded internationally at the permit price q. A 
positive permit price implies a downward shift in the inverse demand function of fuels. 
Producers are then faced with the following effective inverse demand functions (or producers’ 
prices) 
 
( ) j,   ia,gi,j qexxp ijii ≠∈−          ,),(                         (2) 
 
The market for the alternative fuel is assumed to be perfectly competitive. The equilibrium 
quantity is then found where the “producer price” given by (2) equals the marginal costs of 
production. We characterize the equilibrium in the market for the alternative fuel in a reduced 
form as follows 
 
),( qxxx gaa =                 (3) 
 
The equilibrium quantity of the alternative fuel xa will decline with the gas volume xg 
because the fuels are substitutes (i.e., ∂xa/∂xg ≤  0). A higher permit price will also reduce the 
quantity of the alternative fuel (for a given level of xg) as long as the emission factor ea is 
positive (i.e., ∂xa/∂q ≤  0). 
The demand for emission permits faced by the permit exporter can be divided into two 
components. First, there is permit demand generated by gas consumption and consumption of 
the alternative fuel (i.e., ). Second, there is the residual permit demand from all 
other emission sources in the participating countries, represented by the demand function 
. The residual permit demand is assumed to decline with the price of permits (d
ggaa xexe +
Q
)(qd
xe aa
q < 0). 
The net demand for emission permits faced by the permit exporter is then 
qdxe gg −++ )( , where Q is the total emission quota allocated to the participating 
countries (except the permit exporting country). 
Let be the costs of generating y units of permits for export. The profit from permit 
exports, , is then 
)(yc
pπ
 
)()( ycqyyp −=π                (4) 
 
The shape of the cost function is determined by the initial allocation of permits to the 
monopoly permit exporter, and by its abatement costs. Due to a high initial allocation of 
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permits to the FSU in the Kyoto Protocol, the FSU may be able to export a certain amount of 
permits at zero costs. Exports beyond this amount will require domestic abatement.  
The equilibrium condition in the market for emission permits can now be formulated as 
 
yQqdxeqxxe gggaa =−++ )(),(               (5) 
 
Eq. (5) defines the equilibrium permit price as a function of the total gas consumption and 
the Russian supply of emission permits, q . The equilibrium permit price is a 
decreasing function of permit supply (i.e. ∂q/∂y < 0). The sign of 
),( yxq g=
gxq ∂∂ /  is however 
ambiguous. Higher gas exports will increase the demand for permits if there are no alternative 
fuels or if the alternative fuels are less emission intensive than natural gas. However, if the 
alternatives are more polluting than gas, higher gas production will reduce in the consumption 
of these alternatives, which implies that the demand for emission permits may fall.5  
The profit of the gas producer, , can now be defined as a function of the gas production 
quantities and the supply of permits. Marginal production costs have been normalised to zero. 
gπ
 
gggggaggggagggg xyxqeyxqxxxpxqexxpyx )),())),(,(,(())((),( , −=−=π     (6)  
 
Profit maximizing behaviour will determine the optimal gas quantity as a function of the 
level of permit exports ( ). )(yxx gg =
The optimal strategies for the gas and permit exporters will depend on the organisation of 
the activities. In the first stage of our analysis, we treat them as separate agents that maximise 
their respective profits independently. We call this the case of uncoordinated market power. 
In the second stage, we treat the gas and permit exporters as one integrated unit that 
maximises the joint profit. This is the case of coordinated market power. As a point of 
reference, however, we start by presenting the optimal solution in the case of a competitive 
permit market. This is useful, because we want to investigate whether the effect of 
coordination on the permit price is large or small relative to the standard monopoly effect.   
2.1 Competitive permit market 
With a competitive permit market, there is no difference between the uncoordinated and the 
coordinated solutions, since all agents take the permit price as given. Assuming that the gas 
producer has market power in the gas market, the first order conditions for profit 
maximisation are as follows: 
0=′−=∂
∂
cq
y
pπ                  (7) 
0)( =∂
∂
∂
∂+∂
∂+−=∂
∂
g
g
a
a
g
g
g
gg
g
g x
x
x
x
p
x
p
qep
x
π
          (8) 
                                                     
5 See Hagem and Mæstad (2002) for a more thorough discussion of the price derivatives.  
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Eq. (7) states that with perfect competition in the permit market, the permit price will equal 
marginal abatement costs. Eq. (8) is simply the standard monopoly condition including the 
cross-price effect through substitution with alternative energy sources.  
2.2 Uncoordinated market power 
With market power in both the permit market and the gas market, and with the permit and gas 
exporters operating as separate economic units, the first order conditions are: 
0=∂
∂+′−=∂
∂
y
y
qcq
y
pπ          (9) 
0=



∂
∂
∂
∂+−∂
∂+



∂
∂
∂
∂+∂
∂+−=∂
∂
g
a
a
g
g
g
g
g
a
a
g
g
g
gg
g
g x
q
x
x
p
e
x
qx
x
x
x
p
x
p
qep
x
π
  (10) 
 
Eq. (9) shows that the optimal permit exports are now given by the standard formula for a 
monopolist’s supply, where marginal revenue from permit exports equals marginal abatement 
costs. For a given level of gas sales, the level of permit exports is reduced in order to raise the 
permit price and extract the monopoly rents.  
The effect on the gas market equilibrium of gas producers being able to influence the 
permit price is more ambiguous, though. The effect via the permit price is captured by the last 
term in eq. (10). The expression within the brackets, 



∂
∂
∂
∂+−
q
x
x
p
e a
a
g
g , represents the effect 
of increased price of emission permits on the producer price of gas. The term –eg reflects the 
direct, negative impact of higher permit price on the producer price of gas. The other term, 
q
x
x
p a
a
g
∂
∂
∂
∂
, is the indirect effect on the producer price of gas via substitution with the 
alternative fuel as the permit price changes. If increased gas export increases (reduces) the 
permit price ( ( )), this term is positive (negative). Hence, on theoretical 
grounds we can determine neither the effect of increased gas production on permit prices nor 
the effect of changes in the permit price on the producer price of gas.  
0/ >∂∂ gxq 0<
2.3 Coordinated market power 
With coordination the emission and permit exporters maximise their joint profit 
gp πππ += . The first order conditions are as follows: 
 
 0=
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By comparing equations (9) and (10) with equations (11) and (12), we realise that 
coordination affects the behaviour of both the permit and the gas exporter. The new term in 
eq. (11) reflects the marginal effect of permit exports y on gas profits, while the new term in 
eq. (12) refers to the marginal effect of gas exports on permit export revenues. As pointed out 
in the discussion above, the signs of these additional terms are ambiguous. The equilibrium 
effects of coordinating the decisions of gas and permit exports are therefore ambiguous. Since 
it is unclear whether a higher permit price will increase or reduce the producer price of natural 
gas, coordination may either increase or reduce the optimal mark-up on emission permits. 
Also, since higher gas exports have an ambiguous impact on the price of emission permits, 
coordination may either increase or reduce the optimal gas export volume. These ambiguities 
call for further analysis through numerical simulations.  
3 A numerical general equilibrium model 
We construct a numerical general equilibrium model in order to explore the mechanisms 
elaborated above. The model is based on the GTAP-EG model (Rutherford and Paltsev 2000), 
which is a static multi-regional model. The data-input to the model is the GTAP-EG dataset, 
which is a reconciled database of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAPv5) database, and 
International Energy Agency (IEA) energy statistics. The GTAP database contains production 
and bilateral trade flow data for 1997. Unfortunately, the database does not allow us to 
distinguish the countries of the Former Soviet Union from each other, so that while our 
interest lies primarily with Russia, we have to deal with the region as a whole in our model.  
While the model contains data for 1997, we want to run scenarios for the Kyoto 
commitment period 2008-2012 (using 2010 as a representative year). The emission 
projections that we use were generated by the Oxford Model for Climate Policy Analysis 
(Bartsch and Müller 2000) and certain unpublished data from that model.6 Because we use a 
static model, we need to assume that the structure of the economy does not change between 
1997 (for which we have data) and 2010 (for which we have emission projections), and to 
scale the required 2010 emissions reductions to the 1997 emissions7.  
The model has 22 world regions and 7 commodities (coal, crude oil, natural gas, petroleum 
products, electricity, energy intensive goods, and other goods).  
The model is an Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium model in Mathiesen format (Mathiesen 
1985), and it is programmed in GAMS-MPSGE. There are two principal agents in the model - 
producers and consumers (representative agents).  
Production is divided into fossil fuel and non-fossil fuel production, which have different 
nesting structures (see Appendix). The output of fossil fuel production is a CES aggregate of 
a natural resource input and a non-resource input. The non-resource input is a Leontief 
composite of labour and intermediates. Non-fossil fuel production has a structure where the 
output is a Leontief composite of intermediate non-energy goods and a four level CES 
aggregate of energy (coal, oil, natural gas and electricity) and primary factors (capital and 
labour).  
The representative consumer, who is endowed with all primary factors, allocates its income 
between investment and private demand. Private demand is derived from utility maximising 
behaviour, where utility is a constant elasticity aggregate of non-energy and energy 
6 Personal communication: A. Aaheim, 2002, Researcher CICERO, Oslo.  
7 Because of this scaling the absolute numbers in the model will be misleading. We therefore report 
only relative changes.  
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consumption. Both intermediate demand and final demand are modelled through an 
Armington aggregation of domestic and imported goods.  
We have kept the production trees and all elasticities of substitution as in the original 
GTAP-EG model (see Appendix).  
We have extended the GTAP-EG model in two areas, by including emissions trading and 
by introducing market power in the FSU permit exports as well as in the FSU gas exports.  
We assume that the Kyoto protocol is implemented through an international emissions 
trading scheme, such that emissions of CO2 from the production and use of fossil fuels require 
emission permits8. In the model this is represented through a zero elasticity of substitution 
(Leontief technology) between the fossil fuel and the emission permit inputs to the production 
(intermediate and final energy demand). The amount of permits required for each unit of 
fossil fuel is determined through emission coefficients, which are implemented in the GTAP-
EG model, and which are calibrated to actual emission in 1997.  
Each region is given an endowment of tradable emission permits. The size of the 
endowment is equal to the Kyoto commitment of the region. The market is modelled as an 
international emission permits trading pool – where all regions initially sell their permits, 
before the sectors in each region purchase the permits that they need – at a world price.  
Market power is exercised by the FSU in the permit and gas export markets. Market power 
is implemented by letting the model search simultaneously for the two optimal mark-ups by 
iterating through the various equilibria until the maximal profits are found. 9 The effect of a 
mark-up in this setting is similar to an export tax. Our formulation implies that domestic gas 
and permit prices in the FSU are equal to marginal production costs, where the marginal costs 
of producing permits for export are equal to the domestic marginal abatement costs.  
4 Results and discussion 
We use the model to explore the two main questions: 1) what does market power imply for 
the optimal permit price when there is market power in the gas market and gas producers also 
take the effect on permit prices into account? 2) what are the effects of coordinating the gas 
and permit exports from the FSU?  
The model was used to run three principal scenarios. In the first scenario, “competitive”, 
there is a competitive permit market, while the FSU has market power in the international gas 
market. We use this scenario as a point of reference for the second scenario, “uncoordinated 
market power”. In this scenario, both permit producers and gas producers take into account 
the effect of their decisions on permit prices. But since they do not take into account the effect 
of the permit price on each other profits, there is an externality between the gas sellers and the 
permit sellers. In the third scenario, “coordinated market power”, this externality is 
internalised by choosing the export quantities that maximise the joint profit of permit and gas 
sellers. The results are summarised in table 1.  
8 The model includes no other greenhouse gases than CO2 . Furthermore, no sinks are included, nor are 
there any emission reductions through the Clean Development Mechanism.  
9 In order to preclude the possibility of finding only a local optimum, we start the iterations from both 
extremes of possible markups/prices in both markets.  
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4.1 Competitive permit market 
We use the “competitive” scenario as a baseline throughout the paper. Therefore, all marginal 
costs – which are equal to the prices in all markets but the international gas market – in the 
competitive case are normalised to one. In the export market for gas, the producer price will 
be equal to marginal cost plus a markup.  
In addition to prices and quantities, the markup profit (not the revenue) from the gas 
market, is also normalised to one. In the rest of this paper, all results are reported as changes 
relative to this scenario.  
The table shows that in the competitive scenario the gas exporter chooses a 61% markup. 
The producer price on gas exports will therefore be 1.61. The FSU exports 29.9% of its total 
emission allowances. The FSU’s market share in the international permit market is then 64%, 
suggesting a considerable potential for exercising monopoly power.  
4.2 Uncoordinated market power 
In the “uncoordinated” scenario, we introduce market power in the international permit 
market. This causes a set of adaptations. The optimal markup on permits is 300%. With a 
300% markup the international permit price increases by 24% to 1.240. Permit exports are 
almost halved; only 16.1% of the total FSU allowances are now exported. The profit from 
permit market exports is large. We have normalised the permit market profit relative to the 
profit from gas exports in the competitive case. The permit market profits are then 2.758.10  
When the permit price changes, the demand for gas is affected. As discussed in section 2, 
whether a higher permit price leads to a positive or a negative shift in the inverse demand 
function for gas is an empirical question. One possible outcome is that, since gas is less 
emission intensive than other fossil fuels, there is a positive effect on the producer price of 
gas through the substitution from other fossil fuels towards gas. However, it turns out that in 
our model, on aggregate, the increased international permit price has a negative effect on the 
(export) demand for gas. As a response to the exogenous negative shift in the inverse demand 
function for gas, it is optimal for the gas producer to reduce its gas exports. In addition, before 
choosing a new export level, the gas producer will take into account the possibility to 
influence the producer price of gas through the price of permits. Since a higher permit price 
leads to a decrease in gas profits, the gas producer has an incentive to reduce its gas supply as 
that causes the permit price to fall. This result is shown in test runs with the model. In 
equilibrium, total FSU gas exports have declined by as much as 10.4%.  
Since the permit exports have decreased, more permits are sold on the domestic market, 
and the domestic permit price falls to 0.310. This leads to a strong increase in the domestic 
demand for gas in the FSU (14.1%). The total effect on gas production in the FSU is an 
increase by 8.8%. Since gas production expands, we move up along the marginal cost curve, 
and the marginal cost of gas production increases to 1.112. In the new equilibrium the optimal 
markup on gas exports is 49%, and this gives a producer price on gas exports of 1.657. The 
possibilities to influence permits prices reduce the profits of the gas exports to 0.846. The 
combined profits in the permit and gas markets are then 3.604.  
 
 
10 Though the absolute numbers can be misleading, it might be useful to get some sense of the absolute 
size of the permit revenue; Permit revenues account for around 1.7% of GDP, and using the 1997 GDP 
for FSU, that would be about US$ 10 billion.  
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Table 1: Results 
Parameter “Competitive” “Uncoordinated” “Coordinated” 
Permit market    
Domestic price 1.000 0.310 0.321 
International price 1.000 1.240 1.236 
Markup 0 % 300 % 285 % 
Exports (of FSU quota) 29.9 % 16.1%  16.5% 
Profits 0 2.758 2.776 
Gas market    
Domestic price (=mc) 1.000 1.112 1.118 
International price 1.61 1.657 1.554 
Markup 61 % 49 % 39 % 
Gas exports 1.000 0.896 0.959 
Profits 1.000 0.846 0.838 
Total profits 1.000 3.604 3.614 
 
4.3 Coordinated market power 
With the “coordinated” scenario we can explore the effects of internalising the externalities 
caused by interdependent demands and imperfect competition in the permit and gas markets. 
Since an increase in the international permit price decreases the profits from the gas exports 
(as reported above), and as an increase in the gas (export) supply leads to a higher 
international permit price (shown in test runs with the model), coordination of the market 
power implies a larger export of both permits and gas. The increased permit supply (which 
produces a lower international permit price), will increase the foreign demand for gas, and the 
increased supply of gas will increase the price received for the permits exported. The joint 
agent chooses to lower the markup on permits to 285%, and the markup on gas to 39%.  
This results in a small decline in the international price of permits from 1.240 to 1.236. 
Hence, we conclude that taking into account the effect on gas profits has a negligible effect on 
FSU’s incentives to exert market power in the permit market. Compared with the 
uncoordinated case, the export of permits increases by only 2.5% in our model runs. 
Our results are qualitatively the same as those obtained by Holtsmark (2003), but the 
magnitudes are much smaller in our study. A likely explanation for this divergence is our 
finer sectoral disaggregation. As argued by Holtsmark, the tax structure on fossil fuels in 
Europe, with high taxes on oil and low taxes on gas, implies that higher permit prices may 
cause substitution from gas to oil, despite the fact that gas is a cleaner fuel. Although this 
effect may show up in aggregate models, like the one used by Holtsmark, we expect it to be 
much weaker in disaggregate models. The reason is that in sectors where substitution between 
oil and gas is most likely to take place (e.g., the electricity sector), oil is not as heavily taxed 
as in the transport sector, where the substitution possibilities are much weaker. Hence, high 
permit prices will have a more positive impact on gas demand in a disaggregated analysis, 
which may explain why we find that coordination has a negligible effect on the optimal 
permit price.   
Coordination increases the profits from the permit exports slightly to 2.776 (up 0.65%). 
The first move of the permit agent is to export more permits than would have been optimal if 
it was not for the coordination policy. The isolated effect of this increase in exports would be 
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to decrease the profits from this market. However, because the gas agent also increases 
exports, and because increased gas exports lead to an increase in the permit price, the final 
outcome is an increase in the profits from the permit market.  
Coordination affects gas exports significantly (up 7.0%). Domestic gas sales in the FSU fall 
only slightly (due to the increased domestic permit price). Still, the total FSU gas production 
increases, and again we move up along the marginal cost curve. While the domestic gas 
producer price (marginal cost) increases to 1.118, the export gas producer price decreases due 
to lower mark-up. Mark-up profits from the gas market are now 0.838. This is a decrease of 
1% from the uncoordinated scenario.  
The combined profits from the two markets are 3.614. This is an increase of only 0.28% 
from the uncoordinated case. However, the small change in total profits hides some larger 
(but opposing) changes. First, the overall increase in profits is the result of a somewhat larger 
increase in profits from the permit market – which is partially offset by a smaller decrease in 
profits from the gas market. Export volume effects are greater though, especially in the gas 
market where exports are up by a significant 7.0%. 
These results reveal that the absolute and marginal profits from the permit market are 
greater than those from the gas market. Gas market profits are “sacrificed” in order to 
increase the permit market profits.  
5 Concluding remarks 
In this paper we have explored the incentives of the FSU to exert market power in the 
international emission permit market while taking into account 1) that the FSU is a large 
natural gas exporter, 2) that the FSU has market power in the European gas market, and 3) 
that the optimal exercise of market power is interdependent between the two markets. We find 
that the FSU has a strong incentive to restrict its permit supply in order to drive up the permit 
price. Being able to influence permit prices also has a strongly negative impact on the optimal 
level of natural gas export from the FSU. This reduction in exports is caused by three factors: 
first, that a higher price on emission permits reduces the demand for natural gas; second, that 
higher gas sales reduce the producer price of gas through a higher permit price, and third, that 
domestic gas demand increases in the FSU as the domestic permit price falls. Furthermore, 
the interdependency between the permit exporter and the gas exporter has only a negligible 
impact in the optimal mark-up in the permit market. However, export of natural gas increases 
significantly as gas producers take into account the positive effect on permit prices of higher 
gas exports.  
Our results are, of course, specific to the scenarios that we have chosen. The emission 
projections have a very significant bearing on the extent of FSU market power – because they 
determine how many permits the FSU will be able to sell at a given price. Also, the model 
parameters, such as the substitution elasticities, will affect the outcome.  
There is scope for further empirical work on theses issues. One possible extension would be 
to model an oligopoly in the gas market. Then, the coordination of gas and permit exports 
might give the FSU strategic advantages or disadvantages vis-à-vis other gas producers. With 
such strategic effects, it is no longer obvious that it is profitable to coordinate the decisions of 
the gas and permit exporters in the FSU (see Hagem and Mæstad, 2002).  
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